files: remove two superfluous calls for shielding temp files from others
If there are still systems where mkstemp() creates world-readable temporary files, then please holler. On current BSDs and on GNU, I've verified that mkstemp() creates files with 0600 permissions.master
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f8366cd5c9
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b48dfde3b2
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@ -1398,7 +1398,6 @@ char *safe_tempfile(FILE **stream)
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{
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const char *env_dir = getenv("TMPDIR");
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char *tempdir = NULL, *tempfile_name = NULL;
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mode_t was_mask;
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int fd;
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/* Get the absolute path for the first directory among $TMPDIR
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@ -1415,12 +1414,8 @@ char *safe_tempfile(FILE **stream)
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tempfile_name = charealloc(tempdir, strlen(tempdir) + 12);
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strcat(tempfile_name, "nano.XXXXXX");
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was_mask = umask(S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO);
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fd = mkstemp(tempfile_name);
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umask(was_mask);
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if (fd == -1) {
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free(tempfile_name);
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return NULL;
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