cbmk/config/coreboot/t500_8mb/target.cfg

tree="default"
xarch="i386-elf"
payload_seabios="y"
payload_grub="y"
payload_memtest="y"
grub_scan_disk="ahci"
Canoeboot 20231026 release Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org> 2023-10-26 19:11:40 +00:00			`tree="default"`
rebase cbmk 9429287 per lbmk c4d90087..f5b04fa5 cbmk 9429287 is the present canoeboot revision, on this day, two commits after canoeboot 20231107 the cbmk revision was based on lbmk c4d90087, but lbmk has developed a lot since, right up to f5b04fa5. lbmk c4d90087 was four commits after libreboot 20231106 this patch brings cbmk up to date, versus lbmk f5b04fa5, which is 135 commits after libreboot 20231106 (not 4) therefore, the next canoeboot release shall import lbmk changes made after lbmk revision f5b04fa5. good day! In English (the above is for my reference, next time I make a new canoeboot release): This imports all of the numerous improvements from Libreboot, sans the non-FSDG-compliant changes. You can find a full list of such changes in the audit4 page: https://libreboot.org/news/audit4.html A full canoeboot-ised changelog will be available in the next canoeboot release, with these and subsequent changes. Most notable here is the update to the new GRUB 2.12 release (instead of 2.12-rc1), and the improvements Riku made to pico-serprog. And the build system improvements from lbmk, such as improved, more generic cmake and autoconf handling. Canoeboot-specific changes: I also tweaked the deblob logic, to make it less error-prone. The new design changes imported into cbmk (based on latest lbmk) somewhat broke the deblob logic; it was constantly reminding the user that blobs.list was missing for coreboot, at config/coreboot/blobs.list - coreboot is a multi-tree project in both cbmk and lbmk, and the deblob logic was tuned for single/multi, but was treating coreboot as both. for simplicity, i removed the check for whether blobs.list is present. this means that the operator must ensure that these files are present, in any given revision, where they are required on a given set of projects (and the files are all present, in this update to cbmk) Also of note: the grub.cfg improvements are included in this cbmk update. The improved grub.cfg can find grub/syslinux configs by default, not just grub anymore, also finds extlinux, and will also find them on EFI System Partition - in addition, UEFI-based install media is also more robust; although cbmk doesn't provide UEFI configurations on x86, our GRUB palyoad does still need to work with distro install media, and many of them now use UEFI-based GRUB configurations in their installation media, which just happen to work with our GRUB Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org> 2024-01-02 11:37:25 +00:00			`xarch="i386-elf"`
censored libreboot c20230710 Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org> 2023-07-10 00:50:01 +00:00			`payload_seabios="y"`
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that have been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org> 2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00			`payload_grub="y"`
censored libreboot c20230710 Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org> 2023-07-10 00:50:01 +00:00			`payload_memtest="y"`
re-configure grub_scan_disk on various targets Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org> 2024-05-27 20:33:53 +00:00			`grub_scan_disk="ahci"`