cbmk/script/roms

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#!/usr/bin/env sh
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
# Copyright (c) 2014-2016,2020-2021,2023-2024 Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Ferass El Hafidi <vitali64pmemail@protonmail.com>
# Copyright (c) 2022 Caleb La Grange <thonkpeasant@protonmail.com>
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Alper Nebi Yasak <alpernebiyasak@gmail.com>
# Copyright (c) 2023 Riku Viitanen <riku.viitanen@protonmail.com>
set -u -e
. "include/lib.sh"
seavgabiosrom="elf/seabios/default/libgfxinit/vgabios.bin"
cfgsdir="config/coreboot"
rp2040src="src/pico-serprog"
rp2040x="$rp2040src/build/pico_serprog.uf2"
picosdk="src/pico-sdk"
rp2040dir="$picosdk/src/boards/include/boards"
stm32src="src/stm32-vserprog"
stm32x="$stm32src/stm32-vserprog.hex"
stm32dir="$stm32src/boards"
# Disable all payloads by default.
# target.cfg files have to specifically enable [a] payload(s)
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
pv="payload_uboot payload_seabios payload_memtest t payload_grub"
v="romdir cbrom initmode displaymode cbcfg targetdir tree release ubootelf"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
v="$v board grub_scan_disk uboot_config grubtree grubelf tmpmv"
eval `setvars "n" $pv`
eval `setvars "" $v boards targets serdir ser`
main()
{
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
if [ "$1" = "serprog" ]; then
[ $# -lt 2 ] && $err "serprog type not set"
[ "$2" != "rp2040" ] && [ "$2" != "stm32" ] && \
$err "invalid serprog type"
eval "x_ ./update trees -f \"\${${2}src##*/}\""
ser="$2" && shift 2 && continue
fi
[ "$1$ser" = "list" ] && x_ ls -1 config/coreboot && return
[ "$1" = "all" ] && shift && continue
boards="$1 $boards"; shift 1
done
[ -n "$boards" ] || [ -n "$ser" ] || boards="$(ls -1 \
config/coreboot)" || $err "can't list coreboot boards"
[ -n "$ser" ] && \
eval "serlist \"\$${ser}dir\" > \"\$tmpdir/ser\" || $err \"!ser\""
[ -n "$ser" ] && [ -z "$boards" ] && boards="$(cat "$tmpdir/ser")"
for x in $boards; do
[ -n "$ser" ] && mkserprogfw "$ser" "$x"
[ -z "$ser" ] && [ -d "config/coreboot/$x/config" ] && \
configure_target "$x" && build_payloads && build_board && \
[ -d "bin/$board" ] && targets="$targets, $x"; continue
done
[ -n "$ser" ] && [ "$xbmk_release" = "y" ] && \
mkrom_tarball "bin/serprog_$ser" && return 0
[ -z "$ser" ] && [ -z "$targets" ] && $err "No images were compiled"
printf "DO NOT flash images from elf/ - use bin/ instead. ALSO:\n"
printf "%s\n" "$kbnotice"
}
mkserprogfw()
{
x_ mkdir -p "bin/serprog_$1"
if [ "$1" = "rp2040" ]; then
x_ cmake -DPICO_BOARD="$2" -DPICO_SDK_PATH="$picosdk" \
-B "$rp2040src/build" "$rp2040src"
x_ cmake --build "$rp2040src/build"
else
x_ make -C "$stm32src" libopencm3-just-make BOARD=$2
x_ make -C "$stm32src" BOARD=$2
fi
eval "x_ mv \"\$${1}x\" \"bin/serprog_$1/serprog_$2.\${${1}x##*.}\""
printf "Look in bin/serprog_%s/ for images\n" "$1"
}
serlist()
{
basename -a -s .h "$1/"*.h || $err "$1: can't list boards"
}
configure_target()
{
eval `setvars "n" $pv`
eval `setvars "" $v`
board="$1"
targetdir="$cfgsdir/$board"
# Override the above defaults using target.cfg
eval `setcfg "$targetdir/target.cfg"`
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
[ -z "$tree" ] && $err "$board: tree not defined"
[ "$xbmk_release" = "y" ] && [ "$release" = "n" ] && return 1
[ "$board" = "$tree" ] && return 1
[ -n "$uboot_config" ] || uboot_config="default"
[ "$payload_uboot" = "y" ] || payload_seabios="y"
[ "$payload_grub" = "y" ] && payload_seabios="y"
[ "$payload_seabios" = "y" ] && [ -n "$payload_uboot" = "y" ] && \
$err "$board: U-Boot and SeaBIOS/GRUB are both enabled."
[ -z "$grub_scan_disk" ] && grub_scan_disk="nvme ahci ata"
make GRUB multi-tree and re-add xhci patches The xHCI patches were removed because they caused issues on Sandybridge-based Dell Latitude laptops. See: https://codeberg.org/libreboot/lbmk/issues/216 The issue was not reported elsewhere, but we still don't need xHCI support in Canoeboot's GRUB because none of the available coreboot targets have xHCI support. However, we may want it in the future and it helps to keep Canoeboot in sync with Libreboot (this patch is adapted from lbmk). Each given coreboot target can say which GRUB tree to use by setting this in target.cfg: grubtree="xhci" In the above example, the "xhci" tree would be used. Some generic GRUB config has been moved to config/data/grub/ and config/grub/ now looks like config/coreboot/ - also, the grub.cfg file (named "payload" in each tree) is copied to the GRUB source tree as ".config", then added to GRUB's memdisk in the same way, as grub.cfg. Several other design changes had to be made because of this: * grub.cfg in memdisk no longer automatically jumps to one in CBFS, but now shows a menuentry for it if available * Certain commands in script/trees are disabled for GRUB, such as *config make commands. * gnulib is now defined in config/submodule/grub/, instead of config/git/grub - and this mitigates an existing bug where downloading gnulib first would make grub no longer possible to download in lbmk. There is another reason for merging this design change from lbmk, and that reasoning also applies to lbmk. Specifically: This change will enable per-board GRUB optimisation in the future. For example, we hardcode what partitions and LVMs GRUB scans because * is slow on ICH7-based machines, due to GRUB's design. On other machines, * is reasonably fast, for automatically enumerating the list of devices for boot. Use of * (and other wildcards) could enable our GRUB payload to automatically boot more distros, with minimal fuss. This can be done at a later date, in subsequent revisions. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-01 22:01:30 +00:00
[ -n "$grubtree" ] || grubtree="default"
grubelf="elf/grub/$grubtree/payload/grub.elf"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
[ "$payload_memtest" = "y" ] || payload_memtest="n"
[ "$(uname -m)" = "x86_64" ] || payload_memtest="n"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
[ "$payload_uboot" = "y" ] && payload_memtest="n"; return 0
}
build_payloads()
{
romdir="bin/$board"
cbdir="src/coreboot/$board"
[ "$board" = "$tree" ] || cbdir="src/coreboot/$tree"
cbfstool="elf/cbfstool/$tree/cbfstool"
cbrom="$cbdir/build/coreboot.rom"
rebase cbmk 9429287 per lbmk c4d90087..f5b04fa5 cbmk 9429287 is the present canoeboot revision, on this day, two commits after canoeboot 20231107 the cbmk revision was based on lbmk c4d90087, but lbmk has developed a lot since, right up to f5b04fa5. lbmk c4d90087 was four commits after libreboot 20231106 this patch brings cbmk up to date, versus lbmk f5b04fa5, which is 135 commits after libreboot 20231106 (not 4) therefore, the next canoeboot release shall import lbmk changes made *after* lbmk revision f5b04fa5. good day! In English (the above is for my reference, next time I make a new canoeboot release): This imports all of the numerous improvements from Libreboot, sans the non-FSDG-compliant changes. You can find a full list of such changes in the audit4 page: https://libreboot.org/news/audit4.html A full canoeboot-ised changelog will be available in the next canoeboot release, with these and subsequent changes. Most notable here is the update to the new GRUB 2.12 release (instead of 2.12-rc1), and the improvements Riku made to pico-serprog. And the build system improvements from lbmk, such as improved, more generic cmake and autoconf handling. Canoeboot-specific changes: I also tweaked the deblob logic, to make it less error-prone. The new design changes imported into cbmk (based on latest lbmk) somewhat broke the deblob logic; it was constantly reminding the user that blobs.list was missing for coreboot, at config/coreboot/blobs.list - coreboot is a multi-tree project in both cbmk and lbmk, and the deblob logic was tuned for single/multi, but was treating coreboot as both. for simplicity, i removed the check for whether blobs.list is present. this means that the operator must ensure that these files are present, in any given revision, where they are required on a given set of projects (and the files are all present, in this update to cbmk) Also of note: the grub.cfg improvements are included in this cbmk update. The improved grub.cfg can find grub/syslinux configs by default, not just grub anymore, also finds extlinux, and will also find them on EFI System Partition - in addition, UEFI-based install media is also more robust; although cbmk doesn't provide UEFI configurations on x86, our GRUB palyoad does still need to work with distro install media, and many of them now use UEFI-based GRUB configurations in their installation media, which just happen to work with our GRUB Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-01-02 11:37:25 +00:00
[ -f "$cbfstool" ] || x_ ./update trees -b coreboot utils $tree
[ "$payload_memtest" = "y" ] && x_ ./update trees -b memtest86plus
[ "$payload_seabios" = "y" ] && x_ ./update trees -b seabios
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
[ "$payload_grub" = "y" ] && x_ ./update trees -b grub $grubtree
[ "$payload_uboot" = "y" ] || return 0
x_ ./update trees -b u-boot $board
ubdir="elf/u-boot/$board/$uboot_config"
ubootelf="$ubdir/u-boot.elf" && [ ! -f "$ubootelf" ] && \
ubootelf="$ubdir/u-boot"
[ -f "$ubootelf" ] || $err "$board: Can't find u-boot"; return 0
}
build_board()
{
x_ rm -Rf "$romdir"
rebase cbmk 9429287 per lbmk c4d90087..f5b04fa5 cbmk 9429287 is the present canoeboot revision, on this day, two commits after canoeboot 20231107 the cbmk revision was based on lbmk c4d90087, but lbmk has developed a lot since, right up to f5b04fa5. lbmk c4d90087 was four commits after libreboot 20231106 this patch brings cbmk up to date, versus lbmk f5b04fa5, which is 135 commits after libreboot 20231106 (not 4) therefore, the next canoeboot release shall import lbmk changes made *after* lbmk revision f5b04fa5. good day! In English (the above is for my reference, next time I make a new canoeboot release): This imports all of the numerous improvements from Libreboot, sans the non-FSDG-compliant changes. You can find a full list of such changes in the audit4 page: https://libreboot.org/news/audit4.html A full canoeboot-ised changelog will be available in the next canoeboot release, with these and subsequent changes. Most notable here is the update to the new GRUB 2.12 release (instead of 2.12-rc1), and the improvements Riku made to pico-serprog. And the build system improvements from lbmk, such as improved, more generic cmake and autoconf handling. Canoeboot-specific changes: I also tweaked the deblob logic, to make it less error-prone. The new design changes imported into cbmk (based on latest lbmk) somewhat broke the deblob logic; it was constantly reminding the user that blobs.list was missing for coreboot, at config/coreboot/blobs.list - coreboot is a multi-tree project in both cbmk and lbmk, and the deblob logic was tuned for single/multi, but was treating coreboot as both. for simplicity, i removed the check for whether blobs.list is present. this means that the operator must ensure that these files are present, in any given revision, where they are required on a given set of projects (and the files are all present, in this update to cbmk) Also of note: the grub.cfg improvements are included in this cbmk update. The improved grub.cfg can find grub/syslinux configs by default, not just grub anymore, also finds extlinux, and will also find them on EFI System Partition - in addition, UEFI-based install media is also more robust; although cbmk doesn't provide UEFI configurations on x86, our GRUB palyoad does still need to work with distro install media, and many of them now use UEFI-based GRUB configurations in their installation media, which just happen to work with our GRUB Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-01-02 11:37:25 +00:00
for it in "normal" "vgarom" "libgfxinit"; do
initmode="$it"
hmode="vesafb"
[ "$initmode" = "vgarom" ] || hmode="corebootfb"
modes="$hmode txtmode"
for y in $modes; do
displaymode="$y"
[ "$initmode" = "normal" ] && \
[ "$displaymode" != "txtmode" ] && continue
cbcfg="$targetdir/config/${initmode}_$displaymode"
[ "$initmode" = "normal" ] && cbcfg="${cbcfg%_*}"
e "$cbcfg" f not || build_roms; x_ rm -f "$cbrom"
done
done
}
build_roms()
{
x_ ./update trees -b coreboot $board
_cbrom="$cbelfdir/$board/${initmode}_$displaymode"
[ "$initmode" = "normal" ] && _cbrom="${_cbrom%"_$displaymode"}"
_cbrom="$_cbrom/coreboot.rom"
cbrom="$(mktemp -t coreboot_rom.XXXXXXXXXX)"
x_ cp "$_cbrom" "$cbrom"
[ "$payload_memtest" != "y" ] || cbfs "$cbrom" \
"elf/memtest86plus/memtest.bin" img/memtest
[ "$payload_seabios" = "y" ] && build_seabios_roms
[ "$payload_uboot" = "y" ] && x_ cp "$_cbrom" "$cbrom" && \
build_uboot_roms; return 0
}
build_seabios_roms()
{
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
if [ "$payload_grub" = "y" ]; then # SeaBIOS with GRUB
t="$(mktemp -t coreboot_rom.XXXXXXXXXX)"
x_ cp "$cbrom" "$t"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
build_seagrub_roms "$t" "seabios_withgrub"
else # SeaBIOS only
t="$(mkSeabiosRom "$cbrom")" || \
safer, simpler error handling in cbmk in shell scripts, a function named the same as a program included in the $PATH will override that program. for example, you could make a function called ls() and this would override the standand "ls". in cbmk, a part of it was first trying to run the "fail" command, deferring to "err", because some scripts call fail() which does some minor cleanup before calling err. in most cases, fail() is not defined, and it's possible that the user could have a program called "fail" in their $PATH, the behaviour of which we could not determine, and it could have disastrous effects. cbmk error handling has been re-engineered in such a way that the err function is defined in a variable, which defaults to err_ which calls err_, so defined under include/err.sh. in functions that require cleanup prior to error handling, a fail() function is still defined, and err is overridden, thus: err="fail" this change has made xx_() obsolete, so now only x_ is used. the x_ function is a wrapper that can be used to run a command and exit with non-zero status (from cbmk) if the command fails. the xx_ command did the same thing, but called fail() which would have called err(); now everything is $err example: rm -f "$filename" || err "could not delete file" this would now be: rm -f "$filename" || $err "could not delete file" overriding of err= must be done *after* including err.sh. for example: err="fail" . "include/err.sh" ^ this is wrong. instead, one must do: . "include/err.sh" err="fail" this is because err is set as a global variable under err.sh the new error handling is much cleaner, and safer. it also reduces the chance of mistakes such as: calling err when you meant to call fail. this is because the standard way is now to call $err, so you set err="fail" at the top of the script and all is well. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <info@minifree.org>
2024-03-27 01:19:39 +00:00
$err "build_seabios_roms: cannot build tmprom"
newrom="$romdir/seabios_${board}_${initmode}_$displaymode"
[ "$initmode" = "normal" ] && newrom="$romdir/seabios" \
&& newrom="${newrom}_${board}_$initmode"
cprom cp "$t" "$newrom.rom"
fi
x_ rm -f "$t"
}
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
build_seagrub_roms()
{
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
tmpmv="$(mkSeabiosRom "$1")" || $err "$board: !mk grub tmprom"
x_ mv "$tmpmv" "$1"
# we only need insert grub.elf once, for each coreboot config:
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
cbfs "$1" "$grubelf" "img/grub2"
printf "set grub_scan_disk=\"%s\"\n" "$grub_scan_disk" \
> "$tmpdir/tmpcfg" || $err "set grub_scan_disk, $grub_scan_disk"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
cbfs "$1" "$tmpdir/tmpcfg" scan.cfg raw
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
newrom="$romdir/seabios_withgrub_${board}_${initmode}_$displaymode.rom"
[ "$initmode" = "normal" ] && newrom="$romdir/seabios_withgrub_" \
&& newrom="$newrom${board}_$initmode.rom"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
cprom cp "$1" "$newrom"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
cbfs "$1" "$grubdata/bootorder" bootorder raw # SeaGRUB
cprom cp "$1" "${newrom%.rom}_grubfirst.rom"
}
# make a rom in /tmp/ and then print the path of that ROM
mkSeabiosRom() {
tmprom="$(mktemp -t coreboot_rom.XXXXXXXXXX)" # 1=cbrom, 2=cbfs path
_seabioself="elf/seabios/default/$initmode/bios.bin.elf"
x_ cp "$1" "$tmprom"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
cbfs "$tmprom" "$_seabioself" "fallback/payload"
rebase cbmk 9429287 per lbmk c4d90087..f5b04fa5 cbmk 9429287 is the present canoeboot revision, on this day, two commits after canoeboot 20231107 the cbmk revision was based on lbmk c4d90087, but lbmk has developed a lot since, right up to f5b04fa5. lbmk c4d90087 was four commits after libreboot 20231106 this patch brings cbmk up to date, versus lbmk f5b04fa5, which is 135 commits after libreboot 20231106 (not 4) therefore, the next canoeboot release shall import lbmk changes made *after* lbmk revision f5b04fa5. good day! In English (the above is for my reference, next time I make a new canoeboot release): This imports all of the numerous improvements from Libreboot, sans the non-FSDG-compliant changes. You can find a full list of such changes in the audit4 page: https://libreboot.org/news/audit4.html A full canoeboot-ised changelog will be available in the next canoeboot release, with these and subsequent changes. Most notable here is the update to the new GRUB 2.12 release (instead of 2.12-rc1), and the improvements Riku made to pico-serprog. And the build system improvements from lbmk, such as improved, more generic cmake and autoconf handling. Canoeboot-specific changes: I also tweaked the deblob logic, to make it less error-prone. The new design changes imported into cbmk (based on latest lbmk) somewhat broke the deblob logic; it was constantly reminding the user that blobs.list was missing for coreboot, at config/coreboot/blobs.list - coreboot is a multi-tree project in both cbmk and lbmk, and the deblob logic was tuned for single/multi, but was treating coreboot as both. for simplicity, i removed the check for whether blobs.list is present. this means that the operator must ensure that these files are present, in any given revision, where they are required on a given set of projects (and the files are all present, in this update to cbmk) Also of note: the grub.cfg improvements are included in this cbmk update. The improved grub.cfg can find grub/syslinux configs by default, not just grub anymore, also finds extlinux, and will also find them on EFI System Partition - in addition, UEFI-based install media is also more robust; although cbmk doesn't provide UEFI configurations on x86, our GRUB palyoad does still need to work with distro install media, and many of them now use UEFI-based GRUB configurations in their installation media, which just happen to work with our GRUB Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-01-02 11:37:25 +00:00
x_ "$cbfstool" "$tmprom" add-int -i 3000 -n etc/ps2-keyboard-spinup
z="2"; [ "$initmode" = "vgarom" ] && z="0"
x_ "$cbfstool" "$tmprom" add-int -i $z -n etc/pci-optionrom-exec
x_ "$cbfstool" "$tmprom" add-int -i 0 -n etc/optionroms-checksum
[ "$initmode" != "libgfxinit" ] || cbfs "$tmprom" "$seavgabiosrom" \
vgaroms/seavgabios.bin raw
printf "%s\n" "$tmprom"
}
build_uboot_roms()
{
tmprom="$(mktemp -t coreboot_rom.XXXXXXXXXX)"
newrom="$romdir/uboot_payload_${board}_${initmode}_$displaymode.rom"
x_ cp "$cbrom" "$tmprom"
cbfs "$tmprom" "$ubootelf" "fallback/payload"
cprom mv "$tmprom" "$newrom"
}
cprom()
{
printf "Creating target image: %s\n" "$3"
rebase cbmk 9429287 per lbmk c4d90087..f5b04fa5 cbmk 9429287 is the present canoeboot revision, on this day, two commits after canoeboot 20231107 the cbmk revision was based on lbmk c4d90087, but lbmk has developed a lot since, right up to f5b04fa5. lbmk c4d90087 was four commits after libreboot 20231106 this patch brings cbmk up to date, versus lbmk f5b04fa5, which is 135 commits after libreboot 20231106 (not 4) therefore, the next canoeboot release shall import lbmk changes made *after* lbmk revision f5b04fa5. good day! In English (the above is for my reference, next time I make a new canoeboot release): This imports all of the numerous improvements from Libreboot, sans the non-FSDG-compliant changes. You can find a full list of such changes in the audit4 page: https://libreboot.org/news/audit4.html A full canoeboot-ised changelog will be available in the next canoeboot release, with these and subsequent changes. Most notable here is the update to the new GRUB 2.12 release (instead of 2.12-rc1), and the improvements Riku made to pico-serprog. And the build system improvements from lbmk, such as improved, more generic cmake and autoconf handling. Canoeboot-specific changes: I also tweaked the deblob logic, to make it less error-prone. The new design changes imported into cbmk (based on latest lbmk) somewhat broke the deblob logic; it was constantly reminding the user that blobs.list was missing for coreboot, at config/coreboot/blobs.list - coreboot is a multi-tree project in both cbmk and lbmk, and the deblob logic was tuned for single/multi, but was treating coreboot as both. for simplicity, i removed the check for whether blobs.list is present. this means that the operator must ensure that these files are present, in any given revision, where they are required on a given set of projects (and the files are all present, in this update to cbmk) Also of note: the grub.cfg improvements are included in this cbmk update. The improved grub.cfg can find grub/syslinux configs by default, not just grub anymore, also finds extlinux, and will also find them on EFI System Partition - in addition, UEFI-based install media is also more robust; although cbmk doesn't provide UEFI configurations on x86, our GRUB palyoad does still need to work with distro install media, and many of them now use UEFI-based GRUB configurations in their installation media, which just happen to work with our GRUB Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-01-02 11:37:25 +00:00
x_ mkdir -p "${3%/*}"
x_ $1 "$2" "$3"
}
main $@