Update coreboot to LB 20240504 (sync lbmk cd9685d1)
With other recent changes, and this patch, Canoeboot is now
in sync with Libreboot lbmk, commit:
cd9685d12d2b71a00cb6766bb85f392d4db92c83
This is with updated deblobbing, and Canoeboot's no-microcode
patches, that disable microcode updates universally.
Several patches from lbmk (for coreboot) aren't needed,
due to being for boards that Canoeboot does not use, so
those patches have been somewhat rebased, and configs
adapted, but this is otherwise identical.
As in previous Canoeboot updates, I've turned off this
option in all coreboot configs:
CONFIG_USE_BLOBS
Turning off that option prevents the coreboot build system
from ever attempting to use any blobs, but in practise it
would not have done so anyway, because Canoeboot disables
all handling of microcode in the build system.
Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <info@minifree.org>
2024-05-03 01:16:47 +00:00
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tree="i945"
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rebase cbmk 9429287 per lbmk c4d90087..f5b04fa5
cbmk 9429287 is the present canoeboot revision, on this day,
two commits after canoeboot 20231107
the cbmk revision was based on lbmk c4d90087, but lbmk
has developed a lot since, right up to f5b04fa5. lbmk
c4d90087 was four commits after libreboot 20231106
this patch brings cbmk up to date, versus lbmk f5b04fa5,
which is 135 commits after libreboot 20231106 (not 4)
therefore, the next canoeboot release shall import lbmk
changes made *after* lbmk revision f5b04fa5. good day!
In English (the above is for my reference, next time
I make a new canoeboot release):
This imports all of the numerous improvements from
Libreboot, sans the non-FSDG-compliant changes. You
can find a full list of such changes in the audit4 page:
https://libreboot.org/news/audit4.html
A full canoeboot-ised changelog will be available in
the next canoeboot release, with these and subsequent
changes. Most notable here is the update to the new
GRUB 2.12 release (instead of 2.12-rc1), and the
improvements Riku made to pico-serprog. And the build
system improvements from lbmk, such as improved, more
generic cmake and autoconf handling.
Canoeboot-specific changes: I also tweaked the deblob
logic, to make it less error-prone. The new design
changes imported into cbmk (based on latest lbmk) somewhat
broke the deblob logic; it was constantly reminding the
user that blobs.list was missing for coreboot,
at config/coreboot/blobs.list - coreboot is a multi-tree
project in both cbmk and lbmk, and the deblob logic was
tuned for single/multi, but was treating coreboot as both.
for simplicity, i removed the check for whether blobs.list
is present. this means that the operator must ensure that
these files are present, in any given revision, where they
are required on a given set of projects (and the files are
all present, in this update to cbmk)
Also of note: the grub.cfg improvements are included in this
cbmk update. The improved grub.cfg can find grub/syslinux
configs by default, not just grub anymore, also finds extlinux,
and will also find them on EFI System Partition - in addition,
UEFI-based install media is also more robust; although cbmk
doesn't provide UEFI configurations on x86, our GRUB palyoad
does still need to work with distro install media, and many
of them now use UEFI-based GRUB configurations in their
installation media, which just happen to work with our GRUB
Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-01-02 11:37:25 +00:00
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xarch="i386-elf"
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2023-07-10 00:50:01 +00:00
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payload_seabios="y"
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roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86
Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload.
These options have been removed from target.cfg handling:
* seabios_withgrub
* grub_withseabios
The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as
the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set.
The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by
default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available).
Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to
make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size
and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues
similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me
that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload.
SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due
to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it
is simply far less likely to break.
If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not
bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload.
Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary
payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that
will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing,
so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user
wants to use a GRUB payload.
You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS
by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at
runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS
documentation says how to do this.
Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add
a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB
from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the
disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel
graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits
as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password
and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide.
Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
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payload_grub="y"
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2023-07-10 00:50:01 +00:00
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payload_memtest="y"
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2024-05-27 20:33:53 +00:00
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grub_scan_disk="ahci"
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