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What would ActivityPub look like with capability-based security, anyway?	2019-01-18

This is the third article in a series of articles about ActivityPub detailing the challenges of building a trustworthy, secure implementation of the protocol stack.

In this case, it also does a significant technical deep dive into informally specifying a set of protocol extensions to ActivityPub. Formal specification of these extensions will be done in the Litepub working group, and will likely see some amount of change, so this blog entry should be considered non-normative in it's entirety.

Over the past few years of creating and revising ActivityPub, many people have made a push for the inclusion of a capability-based security model as the core security primitive (instead, the core security primitive is “this section is non-normative,” but I'm not salty), but what would that look like?

There's a few different proposals in the works at varying stages of development that could be used to retrofit capability-based security into ActivityPub:

OCAP-LD, which adds a generic object capabilities framework for any consumer of JSON-LD (such as the Linked Data Platform, or the neutered version of LDP that is described as part of ActivityPub),
Litepub Capability Enforcement, which is preliminarily described by this blog post, and
PolaPub aka CapabilityPub which is only an outline stored in an .org document. It is presumed that PolaPub or CapabilityPub or whatever it is called next week will be built on OCAP-LD, but in fairness, this is pure speculation.

Why capabilities instead of ACLs?

ActivityPub, like the fediverse in general, is an open world system. Traditional ACLs fail to provide proper scalability to the possibility of 100s of millions of accounts across millions of instances. Object capabilities, on the other hand, are opaque tokens which allow the bearer to possibly consume a set of permissions.

The capability enforcement proposals presently proposed would be deployed as a hybrid approach: capabilities to provide horizontal scalability for the large number of accounts and instances, and deny lists to block specific interactions from actors. The combination of capabilities and deny lists provides for a highly robust permissions system for the fediverse, and mimics previous work on federated open world systems.

Drawing inspiration from previous work: the Second Life Open Grid Protocol

I've been following large scale interactive communications architectures for many years, which has allowed me to learn many things about the design and implementation of open world horizontally-scaled systems.

One of the projects that I followed very closely was started in 2008, as a collaboration between Linden Lab, IBM and some other participants: the Open Grid Protocol. While the Open Grid Protocol itself ultimately did not work out for various reasons (largely political), a large amount of the work was recycled into a significant redesign of the Second Life service's backend, and the SL grid itself now resembles a federated network in many ways.

OGP was built on the concept of using capability tokens as URIs, which would either map to an active web service or a confirmation. Since the capability token was opaque and difficult to forge, it provided sufficient proof of authentication without sharing any actual information about the authorization itself: the web services act on the session established by the capability URIs instead of on an account directly.

Like ActivityPub, OGP is an actor-centric messaging protocol: when logging in, the login server provides a set of “seed capabilities”, which allow use of the other services. From the perspective of the other services, invocation of those capability URIs is seen as an account performing an action. Sound familiar in a way?

The way Linden Lab implemented this part of OGP was by having a capabilities server which handled routing the invoked capability URIs to other web services. This step in and of itself is not particularly required, an OGP implementation could handle consumption of the capability URIs directly, as OpenSim does for example.

Bringing capability URIs into ActivityPub as a first step

So, we have established that capability URIs are an opaque token that can be called as a substitute for whatever backend web service was going to be used in the first place. But, what does that get us?

The simplest way to look at it is this way: there are activities which are relayable and others which are not relayable. Both can become capability-enabled, but require separate strategies.

Relayable activities

Create (in this context, thread replies) activities are relayable. This means the capability can simply be invoked by treating it as an inbox, and the server the capability is invoked on will relay the side effects forward. The exact mechanism for this is not yet defined, as it will require prototyping and verification, but it's not impossible. Capability URIs for relayable activities can likely be directly aliased to the sharedInbox if one is available, however.

Intransitive activities

Intransitive activities (ones which act on a pre-existing object that is not supplied) like Announce, Like, Follow will require proofs. We can already provide proofs in the form of an Accept activity:

{
  "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
  "id": "https://example.social/proofs/fa43926a-63e5-4133-9c52-36d5fc6094fa",
  "type": "Accept",
  "actor": "https://example.social/users/bob",
  "object": {
    "id": "https://example.social/activities/12945622-9ea5-46f9-9005-41c5a2364f9c",
    "type": "Announce",
    "object": "https://example.social/objects/d6cb8429-4d26-40fc-90ef-a100503afb73",
    "actor": "https://example.social/users/alyssa",
    "to": ["https://example.social/users/alyssa/followers"],
    "cc": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams#Public"]
  }
}

This proof can be optionally signed with LDS in the same way as OCAP-LD proofs. Signing the proof is not covered here, and the proof must be fetchable, as somebody looking to distribute their intransitive actions on objects known to be security labeled must validate the proof somehow.

Object capability discovery

A security labelled object has a new field, capabilities which is an Object that contains a set of allowed actions and the corresponding capability URI for them:

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
    "https://litepub.social/litepub/lice-v0.0.1.jsonld"
  ],
  "capabilities": {
    "Announce": "https://example.social/caps/4f230498-5a01-4bb5-b06b-e3625fc03947",
    "Create": "https://example.social/caps/d4c4d96a-36d9-4df5-b9da-4b8c74e02567",
    "Like": "https://example.social/caps/21a946fb-1bad-48ae-82c1-e8d1d2ab28c3"
  },
  [...]
}

Example: Invoking a capability

Bob makes a post, which he allows liking, and replying, but not announcing. That post looks like this:

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
    "https://litepub.social/litepub/lice-v0.0.1.jsonld"
  ],
  "capabilities": {
    "Create": "https://example.social/caps/d4c4d96a-36d9-4df5-b9da-4b8c74e02567",
    "Like": "https://example.social/caps/21a946fb-1bad-48ae-82c1-e8d1d2ab28c3"
  },
  "id": "https://example.social/objects/d6cb8429-4d26-40fc-90ef-a100503afb73",
  "type": "Note",
  "content": "I'm really excited about the new capabilities feature!",
  "attributedTo": "https://example.social/users/bob"
}

As you can tell, the capabilities object does not include an Announce grant, which means that a proof will not be provided for Announce objects.

Alyssa wants to like the post, so she creates a normal Like activity and sends it to the Like capability URI. The server responds with an Accept object that she can forward to her recipients:

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
    "https://litepub.social/litepub/lice-v0.0.1.jsonld"
  ],
  "id": "https://example.social/proofs/fa43926a-63e5-4133-9c52-36d5fc6094fa",
  "type": "Accept",
  "actor": "https://example.social/users/bob",
  "object": {
    "id": "https://example.social/activities/12945622-9ea5-46f9-9005-41c5a2364f9c",
    "type": "Like",
    "object": "https://example.social/objects/d6cb8429-4d26-40fc-90ef-a100503afb73",
    "actor": "https://example.social/users/alyssa",
    "to": [
      "https://example.social/users/alyssa/followers",
      "https://example.social/users/bob"
    ]
  }
}

Bob can be removed from the recipient list, as he already processed the side effects of the activity when he accepted it. Alyssa can then forward this object on to her followers, which can verify the proof by fetching it, or alternatively verifying the LDS signature if present.

Example: Invoking a relayable capability

Some capabilities, like Create result in the server hosting the invoked capability relaying the message forward instead of using proofs.

In this example, the post being relayed is assumed to be publicly accessible. Instances where a post is not publicly accessible should create a capability URI which returns the post object.

Alyssa decides to post a reply to the message from Bob she just liked above:

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
    "https://litepub.social/litepub/lice-v0.0.1.jsonld"
  ],
  "to": ["https://example.social/users/alyssa/followers"],
  "cc": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams#Public"],
  "type": "Create",
  "actor": "https://www.w3.org/users/alyssa",
  "object": {
    "capabilities": {
      "Create": "https://example.social/caps/97706df4-86c0-480d-b8f5-f362a1f45a01",
      "Like": "https://example.social/caps/6db4bec5-619d-45a2-b3d7-82e5a30ce8a5"
    },
    "type": "Note",
    "content": "I am really liking the new object capabilities feature too!",
    "attributedTo": "https://example.social/users/alyssa"
  }
}

An astute reader will note that the capability set is the same as the parent. This is because the parent reserves the right to reject any post which requests more rights than were in the parent post's capability set.

Alyssa POSTs this message to the Create capability from the original message and gets back a 202 Accepted status from the server. The server will then relay the message to her followers collection by dereferencing it remotely.

A possible extension here would be to allow the Create message to become intransitive and combined with a proof. This could be done by leaving the to and cc fields empty, and specifying audience instead or something along those lines.

Considerations with backwards compatibility

Obviously, it goes without saying that an ActivityPub 1.0 implementation can ignore these capabilities and do whatever they want to do. Thusly, it is suggested that messages with security labelling contrary to what is considered normal for ActivityPub 1.0 are not sent to ActivityPub 1.0 servers.

Determining what servers are compatible ahead of time is still an area that needs significant research activity, but I believe it can be done!

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