135 lines
7.2 KiB
Markdown
135 lines
7.2 KiB
Markdown
# Dell Laptop Internal Flashing
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This utility allows you to use flashprog's internal programmer to program the
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entire BIOS flash chip from software while still running the original Dell
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BIOS, which normally restricts software writes to the flash chip. It seems like
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this works on any Dell laptop that has an EC similar to the SMSC MEC5035 on the
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E6400, which mainly seem to be the Latitude and Precision lines starting from
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around 2008 (E6400 era).
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## TL;DR
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### Linux specific
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- On Linux, ensure you are booting with the `iomem=relaxed` kernel parameter.
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- If you get a "Function not implemented" error, ensure that your kernel has
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"CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM" set to "y". Here are several common locations for
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the config and how to check them:
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- `zcat /proc/config.gz | grep IOPL`
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- `grep IOPL /boot/config`
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- `grep IOPL /boot/config-$(uname -r)`
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If it says it is not set, then you will need to install or compile a kernel
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with that option set.
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### OpenBSD/NetBSD
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- On OpenBSD/NetBSD, ensure you are booting with securelevel set to -1.
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### General
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Make sure an AC adapter is plugged into your system
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Run `make` to compile the utility, and then run `./dell_flash_unlock` with
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root/superuser permissions and follow the directions it outputs.
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## Confirmed supported devices
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- Latitude E6400, E6500
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- Latitude E6410, E4310
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- Latitude E6420, E6520
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- Latitude E6430, E6530, E5530
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- Latitude E7240
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- Precision M6800, M5800
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It is likely that any other Latitude/Precision laptops from the same era as
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devices specifically mentioned in the above list will work as Dell seems to use
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the same ECs in one generation.
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## Tested
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These systems have been tested, but were reported as not working with
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dell-flash-unlock. This could be due to user error, a bug in this utility, or
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the feature not being implemented in Dell's firmware. If you have such a system,
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please test the utility and report whether or not it actually works for you.
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- Latitude E6220
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- Latitude E6330
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## Detailed device specific behavior
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- On GM45 era laptops, the expected behavior is that you will run the utility
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for the first time, which will tell the EC to set the descriptor override on
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the next boot. Then you will need to shut down the system, after which the
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system will automatically boot up. You should then re-run the utility to
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disable SMM, after which you can run flashprog. Finally, you should run the
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utility a third time to reenable SMM so that shutdown works properly
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afterwards.
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- On 1st Generation Intel Core systems such as the E6410 and newer, run the
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utility and shutdown in the same way as the E6400. However, it seems like the
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EC no longer automatically boots the system. In this case you should manually
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power it on. It also seems that the firmware does not set the BIOS Lock bit
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when the descriptor override is set, making the 2nd run after the reboot
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technically unnecessary. There is no harm in rerunning it though, as the
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utility can detect when the flash is unlocked and perform the correct steps
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as necessary.
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## How it works
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There are several ways the firmware can protect itself from being overwritten.
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One way is the Intel Flash Descriptor (IFD) permissions. On Intel systems, the
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flash image is divided into several regions such as the IFD itself, Gigabit
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Ethernet (GBE) non-volative memory, Management Engine (ME) firmware, Platform
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Data (PD), and the BIOS. The IFD contains a section which specifies the
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read/write permissions for each SPI controller (such as the host system) and
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each region of the flash, which are enforced by the chipset.
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On the Latitude E6400, the host has read-only access to the IFD, no access to
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the ME region, and read-write access to the PD, GBE, and BIOS regions. In order
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for flashprog to write to the entire flash internally, the host needs full
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permissions to all of these regions. Since the IFD is read only, we cannot
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change these permissions unless we directly access the chip using an external
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programmer, which defeats the purpose of internal flashing.
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However, Intel chipsets have a pin strap that allows the flash descriptor
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permissions to be overridden depending on the value of the pin at power on,
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granting RW permissions to all regions. On the ICH9M chipset on the E6400, this
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pin is HDA\_DOCK\_EN/GPIO33, which will enable the override if it is sampled
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low. This pin happens to be connected to a GPIO controlled by the Embedded
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Controller (EC), a small microcontroller on the board which handles things like
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the keyboard, touchpad, LEDs, and other system level tasks. Software can send a
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certain command to the EC, which tells it to pull GPIO33 low on the next boot.
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Although we now have full access according to the IFD permissions, we still
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cannot flash the whole chip, due to another protection the firmware uses.
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Before software can update the BIOS, it must change the BIOS Write Enable
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(BIOSWE) bit in the chipset from 0 to 1. However, if the BIOS Lock Enable (BLE)
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bit is also set to 1, then changing the BIOSWE bit triggers a System Management
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Interrupt (SMI). This causes the processor to enter System Management Mode
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(SMM), a highly privileged x86 execution state which operates transparently to
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the operating system. The code that SMM runs is provided by the BIOS, which
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checks the BIOSWE bit and sets it back to 0 before returning control to the OS.
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This feature is intended to only allow SMM code to update the system firmware.
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As the switch to SMM suspends the execution of the OS, it appears to the OS
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that the BIOSWE bit was never set to 1. Unfortunately, the BLE bit cannot be
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set back to 0 once it is set to 1, so this functionality cannot be disabled
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after it is first enabled by the BIOS.
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Older versions of the E6400 BIOS did not set the BLE bit, allowing flashprog to
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flash the entire flash chip internally after only setting the descriptor
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override. However, more recent versions do set it, so we may have hit a dead
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end unless we force downgrade to an older version (though there is a more
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convenient method, as we are about to see).
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What if there was a way to sidestep the BIOS Lock entirely? As it turns out,
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there is, and it's called the Global SMI Enable (GBL\_SMI\_EN) bit. If it's set
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to 1, then the chipset will generate SMIs, such as when we change BIOSWE with
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BLE set. If it's 0, then no SMI will be generated, even with the BLE bit set.
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On the E6400, GBL\_SMI\_EN is set to 1, and it can be changed back to 0, unlike
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the BLE bit. But there still might be one bit in the way, the SMI\_LOCK bit,
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which prevents modifications to GBL\_SMI\_EN when SMI\_LOCK is 1. Like the BLE
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bit, it cannot be changed back to 0 once it set to 1. But we are in luck, as
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the vendor E6400 BIOS leaves SMI\_LOCK unset at 0, allowing us to clear
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GBL\_SMI\_EN and disable SMIs, bypassing the BIOS Lock protections.
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There are other possible protection mechanisms that the firmware can utilize,
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such as Protected Range Register settings, which apply access permissions to
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address ranges of the flash, similar to the IFD. However, the E6400 vendor
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firmware does not utilize these, so they will not be discussed.
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## References
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- Open Security Training: Advanced x86: BIOS and SMM Internals - SMI Suppression
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- https://opensecuritytraining.info/IntroBIOS_files/Day1_XX_Advanced%20x86%20-%20BIOS%20and%20SMM%20Internals%20-%20SMI%20Suppression.pdf
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