lbmk/script/roms

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#!/usr/bin/env sh
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
# Copyright (c) 2014-2016,2020-2021,2023-2024 Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Ferass El Hafidi <vitali64pmemail@protonmail.com>
# Copyright (c) 2022 Caleb La Grange <thonkpeasant@protonmail.com>
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Alper Nebi Yasak <alpernebiyasak@gmail.com>
# Copyright (c) 2023 Riku Viitanen <riku.viitanen@protonmail.com>
set -u -e
. "include/lib.sh"
tmprom="$tmpdir/rom"
seavgabiosrom="elf/seabios/default/libgfxinit/vgabios.bin"
cfgsdir="config/coreboot"
rp2040src="src/pico-serprog"
rp2040x="$rp2040src/build/pico_serprog.uf2"
picosdk="src/pico-sdk"
rp2040dir="$picosdk/src/boards/include/boards"
stm32src="src/stm32-vserprog"
stm32x="$stm32src/stm32-vserprog.hex"
stm32dir="$stm32src/boards"
# Disable all payloads by default.
# target.cfg files have to specifically enable [a] payload(s)
pv="payload_uboot payload_seabios payload_memtest payload_grub"
v="romdir initmode displaymode targetdir tree release ubootelf"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
v="$v board grub_scan_disk uboot_config grubtree grubelf tmpmv"
eval `setvars "n" $pv`
eval `setvars "" $v boards targets serdir ser`
main()
{
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
if [ "$1" = "serprog" ]; then
[ $# -lt 2 ] && $err "serprog type not set"
[ "$2" != "rp2040" ] && [ "$2" != "stm32" ] && \
$err "invalid serprog type"
eval "x_ ./update trees -f \"\${${2}src##*/}\""
ser="$2" && shift 2 && continue
fi
[ "$1$ser" = "list" ] && x_ ls -1 config/coreboot && return
[ "$1" = "all" ] && shift && continue
boards="$1 $boards"; shift 1
done
[ -n "$boards" ] || [ -n "$ser" ] || boards="$(ls -1 \
config/coreboot)" || $err "can't list coreboot boards"
[ -n "$ser" ] && \
eval "serlist \"\$${ser}dir\" > \"\$tmpdir/ser\" || $err \"!ser\""
[ -n "$ser" ] && [ -z "$boards" ] && boards="$(cat "$tmpdir/ser")"
for x in $boards; do
[ -n "$ser" ] && mkserprogfw "$ser" "$x"
[ -z "$ser" ] && [ -d "config/coreboot/$x/config" ] && \
configure_target "$x" && build_roms && \
[ -d "bin/$board" ] && targets="$targets, $x" && \
[ "$XBMK_RELEASE" = "y" ] && mkrom_tarball "bin/$x"
done
[ -n "$ser" ] && [ "$XBMK_RELEASE" = "y" ] && \
mkrom_tarball "bin/serprog_$ser" && return 0
[ -z "$ser" ] && [ -z "$targets" ] && $err "No images were compiled"
[ -z "$ser" ] && printf "ROMs built in bin/ for: %s\n" "${targets#, }"
[ -n "$ser" ] && printf "ROMs (serprog) built in bin/%s/\n" "$ser"
printf "Please flash from bin/, NOT elf/ - ALSO:\n%s\n" "$kbnotice"
}
mkserprogfw()
{
x_ mkdir -p "bin/serprog_$1"
[ "$1" = "rp2040" ] && x_ cmake -DPICO_BOARD="$2" \
-DPICO_SDK_PATH="$picosdk" -B "$rp2040src/build" "$rp2040src" && \
x_ cmake --build "$rp2040src/build"
[ "$1" = "stm32" ] && x_ make -C "$stm32src" libopencm3-just-make \
BOARD=$2 && x_ make -C "$stm32src" BOARD=$2
eval "x_ mv \"\$${1}x\" \"bin/serprog_$1/serprog_$2.\${${1}x##*.}\""
}
serlist()
{
basename -a -s .h "$1/"*.h || $err "$1: can't list boards"
}
configure_target()
{
eval `setvars "n" $pv`
eval `setvars "" $v`
board="$1"; targetdir="$cfgsdir/$board"; romdir="bin/$board"
# Override the above defaults using target.cfg
eval `setcfg "$targetdir/target.cfg"`
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
[ -z "$tree" ] && $err "$board: tree not defined"
[ "$XBMK_RELEASE" = "y" ] && [ "$release" = "n" ] && return 1
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
[ "$board" = "$tree" ] && return 1
x_ ./update trees -b coreboot $board
cbdir="src/coreboot/$tree"
cbfstool="elf/cbfstool/$tree/cbfstool"
[ -f "$cbfstool" ] || x_ ./update trees -b coreboot utils $tree
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
[ -n "$uboot_config" ] || uboot_config="default"
[ "$payload_uboot" = "y" ] || payload_seabios="y"
[ "$payload_grub" = "y" ] && payload_seabios="y"
[ "$payload_seabios" = "y" ] && [ -n "$payload_uboot" = "y" ] && \
$err "$board: U-Boot and SeaBIOS/GRUB are both enabled."
[ -z "$grub_scan_disk" ] && grub_scan_disk="nvme ahci ata"
make GRUB multi-tree and re-add xhci patches Re-add xHCI only on haswell and broadwell machines, where they are needed. Otherwise, keep the same GRUB code. The xHCI patches were removed because they caused issues on Sandybridge-based Dell Latitude laptops. See: https://codeberg.org/libreboot/lbmk/issues/216 The issue was not reported elsewhere, including on the Haswell/Broadwell hardware where they are needed, but the build system could only build one version of GRUB. The older machines do not need xHCI patches, because they either do not have xHCI patches, or work (in GRUB) because they're in EHCI mode when running the payload. So, the problem is that we need the xHCI patches for GRUB on Haswell/Broadwell hardware, but the patches break Sandybridge hardware, and we only had the one build of GRUB. To mitigate this problem, the build system now supports building multiple revisions of GRUB, with different patches, and each given coreboot target can say which GRUB tree to use by setting this in target.cfg: grubtree="xhci" In the above example, the "xhci" tree would be used. Some generic GRUB config has been moved to config/data/grub/ and config/grub/ now looks like config/coreboot/ - also, the grub.cfg file (named "payload" in each tree) is copied to the GRUB source tree as ".config", then added to GRUB's memdisk in the same way, as grub.cfg. Several other design changes had to be made because of this: * grub.cfg in memdisk no longer automatically jumps to one in CBFS, but now shows a menuentry for it if available * Certain commands in script/trees are disabled for GRUB, such as *config make commands. * gnulib is now defined in config/submodule/grub/, instead of config/git/grub - and this mitigates an existing bug where downloading gnulib first would make grub no longer possible to download in lbmk. The coreboot option CONFIG_FINALIZE_USB_ROUTE_XHCI has been re-enabled on: Dell OptiPlex 9020 MT, Dell OptiPlex 9020 SFF, Lenovo ThinkPad T440p and Lenovo ThinkPad W541 - now USB should work again in GRUB. The GRUB payload has been re-enabled on HP EliteBook 820 G2. This change will enable per-board GRUB optimisation in the future. For example, we hardcode what partitions and LVMs GRUB scans because * is slow on ICH7-based machines, due to GRUB's design. On other machines, * is reasonably fast, for automatically enumerating the list of devices for boot. Use of * (and other wildcards) could enable our GRUB payload to automatically boot more distros, with minimal fuss. This can be done at a later date, in subsequent revisions. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-01 22:01:30 +00:00
[ -n "$grubtree" ] || grubtree="default"
grubelf="elf/grub/$grubtree/payload/grub.elf"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
[ "$payload_memtest" = "y" ] || payload_memtest="n"
[ "$(uname -m)" = "x86_64" ] || payload_memtest="n"; return 0
}
build_roms()
{
x_ rm -Rf "$romdir"
for cbcfg in "$targetdir/config/"*; do
[ -f "$cbcfg" ] || continue; cn="${cbcfg##*/}"; dt="${cn#*_}" \
&& [ "$dt" = "$cn" ] && dt="txtmode"; displaymode="$dt"
initmode="${cn%%_*}"; chkvars initmode displaymode
e "$cbcfg" f not || add_payloads
done; x_ rm -f "$tmprom"
}
add_payloads()
{
cbuild="$cbelfdir/$board/${initmode}_$displaymode"
[ "$initmode" = "normal" ] && cbuild="${cbuild%"_$displaymode"}"
x_ cp "$cbuild/coreboot.rom" "$tmprom"
[ "$payload_seabios" = "y" ] && add_seabios_payload
[ "$payload_uboot" = "y" ] || return 0
# add u-boot payload
ubdir="elf/u-boot/$board/$uboot_config"; ubootelf="$ubdir/u-boot.elf" \
&& [ ! -f "$ubootelf" ] && ubootelf="$ubdir/u-boot"
[ -f "$ubootelf" ] || x_ ./update trees -b u-boot $board
[ -f "$ubootelf" ] || $err "$board: Can't find u-boot"
cbfs "$tmprom" "$ubootelf" "fallback/payload"
cprom "$romdir/uboot_payload_${board}_${initmode}_$displaymode.rom"
}
add_seabios_payload()
{
_seabioself="elf/seabios/default/$initmode/bios.bin.elf"
x_ ./update trees -b seabios
pstr="seabios" && [ "$payload_grub" = "y" ] && pstr="seabios_withgrub"
newrom="$romdir/${pstr}_${board}_$initmode.rom"
[ "$initmode" = "normal" ] || newrom="${newrom%.rom}_$displaymode.rom"
roms: only support SeaBIOS/SeaGRUB on x86 Never, ever build images where GRUB is the primary payload. These options have been removed from target.cfg handling: * seabios_withgrub * grub_withseabios The "payload_grub" variable now does the same thing as the old "seabios_withgrub" variable, if set. The "grubonly" configuration is retained, and enabled by default when SeaGRUB is enabled (non-grubonly also available). Due to lbmk issue #216, it is no longer Libreboot policy to make GRUB the primary payload on any board. GRUB's sheer size and complexity, plus the large number of memory corruption issues similar to it that *have* been fixed over the years, tells me that GRUB is a liability when it is the primary payload. SeaBIOS is a much safer payload to run as primary, on x86, due to its smaller size and much more conservative development; it is simply far less likely to break. If GRUB breaks in the future, the user's machine is not bricked. This is because SeaBIOS is the default payload. Since I no longer wish to ever provide GRUB as a primary payload, supporting it in lbmk adds needless bloat that will later probably break anyway due to lack of testing, so let's just assume SeaGRUB in all cases where the user wants to use a GRUB payload. You can mitigate potential security issues with SeaBIOS by disabling option ROM execution, which can be done at runtime by inserting integers into CBFS. The SeaBIOS documentation says how to do this. Libreboot's GRUB hardening guide still says how to add a bootorder file in CBFS, making SeaBIOS only load GRUB from CBFS, and nothing else. This, combined with the disablement of option ROM execution (if using Intel graphics), pretty much provides the same security benefits as GRUB-as-primary, for example when setting a GRUB password and GPG checks, with encrypted /boot as in the hardening guide. Signed-off-by: Leah Rowe <leah@libreboot.org>
2024-06-22 21:57:39 +00:00
cbfs "$tmprom" "$_seabioself" "fallback/payload"
x_ "$cbfstool" "$tmprom" add-int -i 3000 -n etc/ps2-keyboard-spinup
z="2"; [ "$initmode" = "vgarom" ] && z="0"
x_ "$cbfstool" "$tmprom" add-int -i $z -n etc/pci-optionrom-exec
x_ "$cbfstool" "$tmprom" add-int -i 0 -n etc/optionroms-checksum
[ "$initmode" = "libgfxinit" ] && cbfs "$tmprom" "$seavgabiosrom" \
vgaroms/seavgabios.bin raw
if [ "$payload_grub" = "y" ]; then
x_ ./update trees -b grub $grubtree
cbfs "$tmprom" "$grubelf" "img/grub2"
printf "set grub_scan_disk=\"%s\"\n" "$grub_scan_disk" \
> "$tmpdir/tmpcfg" || $err "$board: !insert scandisk"
cbfs "$tmprom" "$tmpdir/tmpcfg" scan.cfg raw
fi
[ "$payload_memtest" = "y" ] && x_ ./update trees -b memtest86plus && \
cbfs "$tmprom" "elf/memtest86plus/memtest.bin" img/memtest
cprom "$newrom" && [ "$payload_grub" = "y" ] && \
cbfs "$tmprom" "$grubdata/bootorder" bootorder raw && \
cprom "${newrom%.rom}_grubfirst.rom"; return 0
}
cprom()
{
x_ mkdir -p "${1%/*}"; x_ cp "$tmprom" "$1"
[ "$XBMK_RELEASE" = "y" ] && mksha512sum "$1" "vendorhashes" && \
x_ ./vendor inject -r "$1" -b "$board" -n nuke; return 0
}
main $@